An urgent debate on strategic autonomy, Deterrence, and the balance of power in a changing global order
The world is undergoing a profound geopolitical transition. The certainties that for decades ensured the balance of power and strategic stability are beginning to crumble. Nuclear deterrence, once considered a relic of the Cold War, is returning to the center of the security debate in Europe. The actions of powers like Russia, the redefinition of the U.S. role in NATO, and a growing sense of vulnerability among countries on Europe’s eastern flank have brought back to the agenda a question that, until recently, was considered taboo: Should the European Union become a nuclear power?
The erosion of the American shield
Since the arrival of the new administration in Washington, the commitment to collective defense has been downplayed. President Trump has repeatedly stated that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security. The gradual withdrawal of strategic support from the United States has caused concern in capitals such as Warsaw, Berlin, and Vilnius. The breakdown of trust is not new, but it has deepened. Analysts like Constanze Stelzenmüller (Brookings Institution) have warned that:
“The American security guarantee can no longer be considered automatic.”
At the same time, traditionally non-nuclear-aligned countries such as South Korea and Japan have also quietly opened internal debates about the need to develop their own deterrent capabilities.
The Ukrainian lesson
The case of Ukraine is key to understanding this shift. Kyiv gave up its nuclear arsenal in 1994 through the Budapest Memorandum, in exchange for territorial integrity guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Two decades later, it has not only lost part of its territory but also faces a prolonged occupation without having received effective protection. The consequence is clear: nuclear deterrence works, and its absence can carry an existential cost. As Bruno Tertrais, deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, recently stated:
“Ukraine’s renunciation was a historic mistake that Europe cannot afford to repeat.”
A shared European deterrent?
France is currently the only nuclear power within the EU. For years, it has been reluctant to share its doctrine, but the context has changed. President Macron has opened the door to discussing a potential “European nuclear umbrella” under certain conditions of shared governance. Experts such as Ulrich Kühn (IFSH, Hamburg) propose a model similar to NATO’s nuclear sharing, but with European leadership. Others, like Claudia Major (SWP, Berlin), point out that any move in this direction requires a complex legal, technical, and political architecture—and its success will depend on the EU’s internal cohesion. However, not all analysts view the nuclear option favorably. Tara Varma (European Council on Foreign Relations) warns of the risk of further weakening the international non-proliferation regime:
“The creation of a European nuclear force could trigger a new arms race on the continent and legitimize actors who currently remain outside the nuclear club.”
Nonetheless, global developments are pointing toward a more fragmented and dangerous scenario. Iran continues advancing toward nuclear capability, and North Korea maintains an active program. Deterrence, whether we like it or not, is being revived. Europe stands at a crossroads, and it is time to decide. The combination of conventional, cyber-hybrid, and nuclear threats demands responses tailored to a new reality. Strategic autonomy cannot be limited to industrial defense or energy diplomacy. As former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it:
“Without real deterrence capability, European sovereignty is an illusion.”
Of course, this is not about abandoning NATO, but rather preparing for a scenario where its reliability is no longer a given. The question is no longer whether the European Union should pursue nuclear capability—but whether it can afford not to. The debate must stop being ideological and become strategic. If Europe wants to maintain its weight in the international system, protect its values, and ensure the security of its citizens, it must at least consider how to take on that responsibility. And it must do so now—before another actor, or reality itself, decides for it.
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